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Can a Private Educational Association ever be 
Liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for 
Depriving an Individual of Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Rights after NCAA 
v.Tarkanian? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits a 
state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. "1 A deprivation of these rights, un-
der color of state law, gives rise to a private cause of action 
under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
was enacted by Congress in 1871.2 In recent history many in-
dividuals have sought relief under section 1983. 
Jerry Tarkanian, the respondent in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 
was one such individual. In Tarkanian, however, the Supreme 
Court ruled, in a five to four decision, that there is no cause of 
action under § 1983 when the alleged violation of a constitu-
tional right was caused by a non-state actor not acting under 
the color of state law.3 
A claim under § 1983 must satisfy two requirements: (1) 
the action causing the alleged constitutional violation must be 
committed by a person acting under color of state law;4 and (2) 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2. Section 1983 reads in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileg-
es, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the other party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other prop· 
er proceeding for redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
3. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, at 199 (1990). 
4. See Burton v. Wilmington Packing Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (As a 
general matter the protections of the fourteenth amendment do not extend to 
"private conduct abridging individual rights."); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 172 (1961) (§ 1983 gives a remedy for violation of fourteenth amendment 
when it occurs "under color of" state law, therefore liability only attaches to those 
wrongdoers "who carry a badge of authority of a state and represent it in some 
capacity, whether they act in accordance [with] their authority or misuse it."). 
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the conduct must in fact deprive the individual of a constitu-
tional right. In Tarkanian, the second prong was never really 
considered since the first requirement proved to be the central 
issue in the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether a private actor 'Qecomes a state actor when 
the state actor follows the prompting of the private actor. 
Part II of this Note presents the facts of Tarkanian. Part 
III discusses the reasoning of Tarkanian's majority and dissent-
ing opinions. Parts IV and V analyze Tarkanian, and attempt 
to propose a guideline for non-state unincorporated educational 
associations wishing to limit their liability under § 1983. 
II. FACTS OF TARKANIAN 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an 
unincorporated association of 960 public and private universi-
ties and colleges from across the country.5 Its function is to 
adopt rules governing member institutions' recruiting, admis-
sions, academic eligibility, and financial aid standards for stu-
dent athletes.6 The NCAA's Committee on Infractions conducts 
investigations, makes factual determinations, and is expressly 
authorized to impose penalties upon member institutions which 
have violated the rules. 7 The NCAA, however, is not autho-
rized to penalize its member's employees directly.8 
The NCAA, after a long investigation, found that the Uni-
versity of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) had committed 38 viola-
tions.9 It also found that Jerry Tarkanian had committed ten 
of the 38 violations personally.10 In 1977, UNLV informed 
Tarkanian that it was going to suspend him in accordance with 
the findings and suggestions of the NCAA. 11 UNL V suspended 
Tarkanian after being notified by the NCAA that UNL V would 
have to show cause why further penalties should not be im-
posed upon the University if it failed to suspend Tarkanian for 
a probationary period. 12 
5. 488 U.S. at 183. 
6. Id. 
7. !d. 
8. Id. at 184. 
9. Id. at 185-86. 
10. Id. at 186. 
11. Id. at 187. 
12. Id. at 186. 
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Faced with a serious demotion, a drastic cut in salary and 
loss of other substantial monetary benefits, 13 Tarkanian filed 
suit in Nevada state court claiming that he had been deprived 
of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.14 The trial court found that Tarkanian had 
been deprived of his due process rights by a state actor (the 
NCAA) and awarded him an injunction from the suspension.16 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision 
in relevant part, fmding that the NCAA engaged in state action 
when it conducted its investigation and recommended that 
Tarkanian be disciplined.16 The United States Supreme Court 
then granted certiorari and reversed.17 
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN TARKANIAN 
With the facts of Tarkanian set fort in part II, the purpose 
of this part will be to discuss the reasoning of both the majority 
and dissenting opinions of Tarkanian. 
A. Reasoning of the Majority 
Justice Stevens wrote on behalf of the five member majori-
ty. 18 He began with a discussion of what constitutes a state 
actor for purposes of § 1983 and concluded that the NCAA was 
not a state actor. Justice Stevens reasoned that UNL V played 
only a small part in the creation of the NCAA's rules, and nei-
ther UNLV's following of the NCAA's suggestion to suspend 
Tarkanian nor the NCAA's great persuasive power over UNLV 
transformed the NCAA from a private party into a state actor. 
13. Id. at 181 n.1, The trial court found that Tarkanian, as head basketball 
coach: 
... is annually paid (in lieu of his salary as a professor) $125,000, plus 
10% of the net proceeds received by UNLV for participation in 
NCAA-authorized championship games, plus fees from basketball camps 
and clinics, product endorsements, and income realized from writing a 
newspaper column, speaking on a radio program entitled 'THE JERRY 
TARKANIAN SHOW,' and appearing on a television program bearing the 




16. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987). 
17. 488 U.S. at 182. 
18. Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy 
joined the majority opinion. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1990). 
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1. An unincorporated association made up of member institu-
tions from a large number of states is not a state actor for pur-
poses of42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Justice Stevens noted that the rules promulgated by 
the NCAA could not be considered Nevada State law. Although 
UNLV, a state actor, had a small part in the formation of the 
rules by virtue of its membership in the NCAA, the great ma-
jority of member institutions were from other states. Therefore, 
it follows that the legislation created by the NCAA is "not the 
product of Nevada," but rather the result of "the collective 
membership, speaking through an organization that is inde-
pendent of any particular state. "19 Stevens concluded that the 
NCAA was a private actor originally, and that only by some 
other theory could it have been transformed into a state ac-
tor.20 
2. A private actor becomes a state actor if a state actor formal-
ly delegates authority to the private actor which enables it to 
conduct itself in a way that deprives an individual of due pro-
cess. 
The Court next dealt with Tarkanian's first claim that 
UNL V delegated its functions to the NCAA, clothing the Asso-
ciation with authority to both adopt the rules governing 
UNLV's athletic programs and to enforce those rules on behalf 
ofUNLV. 
Stevens first noted that the typical case raising a 
state-action issue involves a private party who has taken deci-
sive steps to deprive an individual of his or her due process 
rights. In such a case, the issue becomes whether the state was 
sufficiently involved to treat the decisive conduct as state ac-
tion. 21 The test in the usual case is "whether the state pro-
vided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the 
harm-causing individual actor."22 
19. Id. at 193; see also Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n., 695 F.2d 1126 
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Louisiana High Sch. Athletic 
Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968). 
20. 488 U.S. at 193 n.13 (However, Stevens noted that the result would be dif. 
ferent for a private organization with a membership made up primarily of actors 
from the same state). 
21. Id. at 192. 
22. Id. n.12; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) 
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However, Stevens pointed out that "this case uniquely 
mirrors the traditional state-action case. "23 For in Tarkanian, 
it was not the private party (the NCAA) that ultimately sus-
pended Tarkanian, it was the state actor (UNL V). The question 
thus becomes "not whether UNL V participated to a critical 
extent in the NCAA's activities, but whether UNLV's actions in 
compliance with the NCAA's rules and recommendations 
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action."24 Stevens an-
swered this question in the negative, fmding that "UNL V dele-
gated no power to the NCAA to take specific action against any 
university employee."25 Rather, "the commitment by UNLV to 
adhere to NCAA enforcement procedures was enforceable only 
by sanctions that the NCAA might impose against UNL V it-
self. "26 Thus, Stevens concluded that UNL V was a state actor 
in its suspension of Tarkanian, but that the NCAA was not. 
Though the NCAA threatened further penalties if the suspen-
sion wasn't made, UNLV made the ultimate decision. UNLV 
could have, if it had wished, refused to follow the recommen-
dations of the NCAA to suspend Tarkanian and risked further 
penalties. 27 
3. A state's conferral of monopoly status does not convert a 
private party into a state actor. 
Finally, Tarkanian argued that the power of the NCAA is 
so great that UNL V had no practical alternative other than to 
comply with the NCAA's demands. In response, Stevens first 
expressed doubt as to whether this claim was even true, 28 but 
concluded that even if it were, it would not follow that the 
NCAA became a state actor. In final analysis, Stevens found 
the issue to be whether "the conduct allegedly causing the 
deprivation of a federal right [can] fairly be attributable to the 
("[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the 
latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."). 
23. 488 U.S. at 192. 
24. Id. at 193. 
25. Id. at 196. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 198. 
28. Id. at 198 n.19 (The Court noted that even though not being in the NCAA 
would pose an obstacle to being a basketball powerhouse, that UNL V still had 
options no matter how distasteful those options were). 
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state. "29 Stevens then reasoned that it would be illogical to 
conclude that the NCAA's imposition of sanctions against 
UNLV is fairly attributable to the state of Nevada, especially 
when the Attorney General steadfastly opposed the sanctions 
during the long adversary proceedings held by the NCAA. 30 
B. Reasoning of the Dissent. 
The dissent, written by Justice White and joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor, focused on whether the 
private party acted jointly with the state actor in the harmful 
conduct. The dissent concluded that on the facts of the case the 
NCAA had acted jointly with UNL V and was therefore a state 
actor in Tarkanian's suspension. 
1. Prior Supreme Court rulings dictate that the test for the 
present case be "whether the private party jointly engaged with 
the state actors in the alleged violation. 1131 
Justice White relied on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 32 and 
Dennis v. Sparks33 for precedent in holding that a private par-
ty "jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action" 
becomes a state actor.34 White argued that it is irrelevant 
which party took the final step that caused the alleged harm. 
2. The facts of Tarkanian clearly indicate that the NCAA 
acted jointly with UNL V in Tarkanian's suspension. 
The dissent found that in Tarkanian, "the NCAA acted 
jointly with UNL V in suspending Tarkanian. "35 First, Justice 
White noted that Tarkanian was suspended for violations of 
rules made by the NCAA which were accepted by UNL V as a 
29. Id. at 199 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). 
30. 488 U.S. at 199. 
31. Id. at 200. 
32. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (plaintiff entitled to 
relief under § 1983 against a private actor if he can prove that the private party 
and a police officer had an agreement to cause their arrest on impermissible 
grounds). 
33. 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (The Court held that a private party became a state 
actor when it willfully participated with a judge in the granting of an illegal in-
junction). 
34. 488 U.S. at 200 (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28). 
35. 488 U.S. at 200. 
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condition to being a member of the NCAA.36 Second, he found 
that UNL V was also forced to let the NCAA conduct hearings 
concerning the violation of NCAA rules in order to be a mem-
ber of the NCAA. 37 And third, UNL V had to agree that the 
"findings of fact made by the NCAA at its hearings would be 
binding on UNLV."36 
In short, the dissent found that "it was the NCAA's find-
ings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA 
conducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNL V in its 
membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in 
Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV."39 Based on these facts, the 
dissent concluded that the NCAA was "jointly engaged with 
[UNL V] officials in the challenged action, "40 and therefore was 
a state actorY 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This part of the note focuses on whether an agreement 
between a state actor and a private party can change the pri-
vate party into a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The first prong of § 1983 imposes liability on a party who vio-
lates an individual's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights 
while acting under color of state law. Tarkanian does not pro-
vide a clear standard for determining § 1983 liability of a pri-
vate party where a state actor commits a violation pursuant to 
an agreement with the private party. 
A. UNL V Had No Reasonable Alternative Other than to Fol-
low the NCAA's Findings and Recommendation to Suspend 
Tarkanian; Therefore, UNL V Delegated its Authority to the 
NCAA. 
The Court found that UNL V was not contractually obligat-
ed to suspend Tarkanian on the findings and recommendations 
of the NCAA, and therefore, UNLV acted unilaterally when it 
suspended Tarkanian.42 The Court noted, however, that if an 
actual delegation of power to discipline individual employees of 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 201. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 202. 
40. Id. (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28). 
41. 488 U.S. at 202. 
42. Id. at 192-94. 
138 BYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION [1992 
member institutions had been contractually made to the 
NCAA, then it would have been a state actor.43 
This view is too rigid and ignores the practical realities of 
the case. Even though UNL V was not contractually obligated to 
suspend Tarkanian, it had no legitimate alternative. The 
NCAA had such power over its member institutions that UNL V 
was forced to choose between suspending its head basketball 
coach, Jerry Tarkanian, and having a basketball program at 
all. Faced with the economic loss which would inevitably hap-
pen to any NCAA Division I institution if it were to lose one of 
its major money-making sports (such as football or basketball), 
UNL V acted in the only way feasible when it implemented the 
NCAA's recommendations and suspended Tarkanian. UNLV 
delegated its decision making authority regarding Tarkanian to 
the NCAA because the school was effectively, if not literally, 
bound by the NCAA's recommendations. 
B. UNL V's Action is Directly Attributable to the NCAA. 
The majority in Tarkanian erred when it concluded that 
the "'conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal 
right' cannot fairly be attributed to Nevada since UNL V had 
conducted its athletic program under policies adopted wholly by 
the NCAA without any input from the state of Nevada. "44 
Whether the state of Nevada was responsible for the 
NCAA's rules and sanctions was irrelevant. Even though the 
rules promulgated by the NCAA were not a result of Nevada 
law, Tarkanian was deprived of federal rights pursuant to 
NCAA rules. UNLV took action against Tarkanian that it oth-
erwise would not have taken but for the NCAA's power over 
UNLV's ability to operate major collegiate sports programs. 
Thus, UNLV's action against Tarkanian should be attributable 
to the will of the NCAA. Therefore, it's only fair that the NCAA 
be considered a state actor since they essentially dictated Neva-
da state action. 
43. Id. at 195. 
44. Id. at 199 (quoting Lugar u. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 937). 
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C. Public Policy Dictates that in Other Cases Arising Along 
Similar Fact Patterns the Test Should be Whether the Private 
Party Acted Jointly with the State Actor in the Harmful Con-
duct to the Individual. 
Public policy suggests that the law should discourage pri-
vate parties from acting jointly with state officials in conduct 
that deprives individuals of federal rights. In Dennis v. 
Sparks, 45 a state trial judge enjoined the production of miner-
als from oil leases owned by the plaintiff. The injunction was 
later dissolved on appeal as having been issued illegally. The 
plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 
the trial judge had conspired with the private party seeking the 
original injunction -a private corporation-the sole owner of 
the corporation, and the two sureties on the injunction bond to 
deprive the plaintiff of due process by corruptly issuing the 
injunction. The Court held unanimously that under these facts 
the private parties were state actors because of their "willful 
participation in joint action with the state or its officials. "46 
In Dennis the trial judge was a more than willing party 
with the private actors in the harmful conduct. In Tarkanian, 
UNL V did not wish to take the harmful action but was forced 
to do so because of the powerful position that the NCAA played 
in relation to UNLV. Suppose that the trial judge in Dennis, 
instead of happily acting in union with the private parties in 
violating an individual's federal rights, had been blackmailed 
into participating with the private parties. Is the private party 
any less involved because the state actor is reluctant? If a pri-
vate party becomes a state actor when it acts voluntarily with 
a state actor in violating a person's federal rights, public policy 
should be even stronger that a private party should also be 
considered a state actor when it prompts an otherwise unwill-
ing state actor to violate a person's federal rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The reasoning of the Court in Tarkanian ignores realities, 
precedent and public policy. It was a five-to-four decision. Such 
decisions, have often been subject to later reversals by the 
Court. However, the Court's current position is that a private 
45. 449 u.s. 24 (1980). 
46. Id. at 27. 
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party does not become a state actor when the state actor is the 
one that takes the final act causing the violation of an 
individual's federal rights. Therefore, unincorporated educa-
tional associations need to be aware of Tarkanian and its rami-
fications on § 1983 liability for them in instances where they 
formulate rules and sanctions for member institutions. 
A. Four Guidelines for Unincorporated Educational Associa-
tions to Best Limit Their Section 1983 Liability. 
Although there are no sure ways to ever completely limit 
liability, there are some basic guidelines that Tarkanian gives 
to unincorporated educational associations to greatly reduce 
their§ 1983 liability to member institution's employees. 
1. The association itself must riot be made up of member insti-
tutions from only one or a few states unless the association is 
comprised of only private institutions. 
The Court in Tarkanian first considered whether the 
NCAA and its rules could fairly be said to be the result of state 
law. It found the NCAA was made up of numerous members 
from a multitude of states and therefore the association or its 
rules could not be deemed the law of any particular state. How-
ever, the Court noted the result would be the opposite if the 
association was made up of member institutions from only one 
state with most of the institutions being state actors them-
selves in their individual capacity. The Court did not indicate 
what the result would be if the association was made up of 
member state institutions from a small number of states. It 
follows that the more states represented the better and the 
fewer states represented the greater chance of having the asso-
ciation deemed a state actor. 
Furthermore, if the organization was made up of only pri-
vate member institutions it could not be deemed to be a state 
actor in and of itself. 
2. Unincorporated educational associations should not impose 
sanctions on member institutions with regard to how those 
institutions discipline their own employees. 
Although the Court in Tarkanian found that the NCAA did 
not become a state actor by threatening further sanctions if 
UNL V did not suspend Tarkanian, the issue and subsequent 
131] NCAA v. TARKANIAN 141 
litigation would have never occurred if the NCAA had simply 
made the sanctions against UNL V itself and left it up to UNL V 
to decide how best to discipline Tarkanian. On this issue educa-
tors need to remember that this was only a five-to-four majori-
ty that could easily be reversed if ever brought before the Court 
again. 
3. Unincorporated educational associations should not let 
member institutions formally delegate power to the association 
to take action directly against individual employees of those 
institutions. 
The Court noted in Tarkanian that the result would have 
been the opposite if UNLV had formally delegated to the NCAA 
the power to discipline UNL V employees directly. The Court 
reasoned that if such a delegation had occurred, UNL V would 
have been contractually obligated to discipline Tarkanian upon 
the NCAA's findings and recommendations; therefore, the 
NCAA could have been considered to have been a state actor. 
4. Unincorporated educational associations should not take 
the final action against member institution employees. 
Finally, Tarkanian ultimately lost his case because it was 
UNLV, the state actor, that suspended him and not the NCAA 
(the private party). The decision in Tarkanian turned on the 
Court's reasoning that when a state actor is the party that 
causes the alleged harm, a private party cannot be considered a 
state actor. It follows that the question of whether a private 
party has violated an individual's federal rights under color of 
state law is only necessary when the private party has in fact 
taken the action that has caused the alleged harm. Therefore, 
if the private party does not commit the act, the first require-
ment of the first prong of § 1983 is not met and whether the 
act was committed under color of state law is irrelevant. 
Samuel Perry Swanberg 
